Bf109 Messerschmitt Ww2 German Fighter Airplane Blitzkrieg

MESSERSCHMITT BF-109 T-SHIRT.  The Bf-109 was a German World War II fighter aircraft that was the backbone of the Luftwaffe all during the war.  This is a beautiful airplane and makes a sweet design.

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MESSERSCHMITT BF-109

The fighter aircraft needed to have a top speed of 400 km/h (250 mph) at 6,000 m (19,690 ft) which it could maintain for 20 minutes, while staying in the air for a total of 90 minutes. The critical altitude of 6,000 meters was to be reached in no more than 17 minutes, and the fighter aircraft was to have an operational ceiling of 10,000 meters.  Power was to be provided by the modern Junkers Jumo 210 engine of about 522 kW (700 hp). It was to be armed with either a single high-performance 20 mm MG C 30 cannon firing through the engine shaft or,

alternatively, either two engine cowl-mounted 7.92 mm (.312 in) MG 17 machine guns, or one lightweight, engine-mounted 20 mm MG FF cannon with two 7.92 mm MG 17s. One other specification was that the aircraft needed to keep wing loading below 100 kg/m2. The performance was to be evaluated based on the aircraft's level speed, rate of climb, and maneuverability, in that order.In fact, the R-III specifications were not in fact devised by the T-Amt; in early-1933, both Heinkel and Arado had sent in privately funded design s for a monoplane plane, and the T-Amt simply gathered the best features from both and dispatched them back out again, adding Focke-Wulf to the invitation to tender.It has been suggested that Bayerische Flugzeugwerke (BFW) was actually not invited to participate in the competition due to personal animosity between Willy Messerschmitt and RLM director

Erhard Milch; however, recent research by Willy Radinger and Walter Shick indicates that this may not have been the case, as all three competing companies—Arado, Heinkel and the BFW—received the development contract for the L.A. 1432/33 requirements at the same time in February 1934. A fourth company, Focke-Wulf, received a copy of the development contract only in September 1939.The power plant was to be the Junkers Jumo 210, but the proviso was made that it would be interchangeable with the more powerful, but less developed Daimler-Benz DB 600 power plant. Each was asked to deliver three prototypes to be delivered for head-to-head testing in late 1934.After Luftwaffe acceptance trials were fulfilled at Rechlin, the prototypes were relocated to Travemünde  for the head-to-head portion of the contest. The aircraft which participated in the trials were the Arado Ar 80 V3, the Focke-Wulf Fw 159 V3, the Heinkel He 112 V4 and the Bf 109 V2. The He 112 arrived first, in early February 1936, and the rest of the prototypes had all arrived by the beginning of March.Because most of the fighter pilots of the Luftwaffe were used to biplanes with open cockpits, low wing loading, light g-forces and easy handling, they were very critical of the Bf 109 at first. However, it soon became one of the front runners in the contest, as the Arado and Focke-Wulf entries, which were intended as "back-up" programmes to safeguard against failure of the two favorites, proved to be completely outclassed. The Arado Ar 80, with its gull wing (replaced with a straight, tapered wing on the V3) and fixed, spatted undercarriage was overweight and underpowered and the style  was abandoned after three prototypes had been built. 

The parasol winged Fw 159 was always considered by the Erprobungsstelle (E-Stelle) staff at Travemünde to be a compromise between the biplane and the aerodynamically more efficient low-wing monoplane. Although it had some advanced features, it used a novel undercarriage model  which was never truly reliable.nitially, the Bf 109 was regarded with suspicion by the E-Stelle test pilots because of its steep ground angle, resulting in poor forward view on the ground; the sideways-hinged cockpit canopy, which could not be opened in flight; and the automatic wing leading edge slots which, it was thought, would inadvertently open during aerobatics, possibly leading to crashes.

They were also concerned about the high wing loading.The Heinkel He 112, based on a scaled-down Blitz was the favorite of the Luftwaffe leaders. Compared with the Bf 109, it was also cheaper. Positive aspects of the He 112 included the wide track and robustness of the undercarriage, considerably better visibility from the cockpit, and a lower wing loading that led to easier landings. However, the He 112 was also structurally complicated, being some 18% heavier than the Bf 109, and it soon became clear that the thick wing, which spanned 12.6 m (41 ft 4 in) with an area of 23.2 m2 (249.7 ft2) on the first prototype (V1), was a disadvantage for a light fighter, decreasing the aircraft's rate of roll and maneuverability. Because of its smaller, lighter airframe, the Bf 109 was 30 km/h (20 mph) faster than the He 112 in level flight, and superior in climbing and diving. As a result, the He 112 V4 which was used for the trials had modern wings, spanning 11.5 m (37 ft 8.75 in) with an area of 21.6 m2 (232.5 ft2). In addition, the V4 had a single-piece, clear-view, sliding cockpit canopy and a more powerful Jumo 210Da engine with a modified exhaust system. However, the improvements had not been fully tested and the He 112 V4 could not be demonstrated in accordance with the rules laid down by the Acceptance Commission, giving a distinct advantage to the Bf 109. The Commission ruled in favour of the Bf 109 because of the Messerschmitt test pilot's demonstration of the 109's capabilities during a series of spins, dives, flick rolls and tight turns, throughout which the pilot was in complete control of the aircraft.In March, the RLM received news that the British Spitfire had been ordered into fabrication; with this information, a quick result to the contest was needed in order to get the winning design  into development. On 12 March, they released a document that outlined the results of the contest, Bf 109 Priority Procurement, as a result of which the RLM instructed Heinkel to radically re-structure  the He 112, while ordering the Bf 109 into manufacture. The Messerschmitt 109 made its public debut during the 1936 Berlin Olympics, when the V1 prototype was flown. As with the earlier Bf 108, the recent pattern  was based on Messerschmitt's "lightweight construction", which was essentially aimed at reducing the total number of parts in the aircraft as much as possible. Examples of this could be found in the use of two large, complicated brackets which were fitted to the main engine firewall; these brackets incorporated the lower engine mounts and landing gear pivot points. A large forging attached to the firewall carried the main-spar pick up points, and carried most of the wing loads. Contemporary design  practice was usually to have these main load-bearing structures mounted on different parts of the airframe, with the loads being distributed through the main structure via a series of strong-points. By centralizing the loads on the main bulkhead, the main structure of the Bf 109 was able to be made relatively light and uncomplicated.An advantage of this model  was that because the outboard-retracting main landing gear, retracting through roughly an 85º angle, was attached to the fuselage, it was possible to completely remove the wings of the aircraft for servicing without the need for additional equipment to support the fuselage. It also meant that the wing structure was able to be simplified through not having to carry the weight of the aircraft and not having to bear the loads imposed during takeoff or landing. However, this had one major drawback—this landing gear arrangement had a narrow wheel track making the aircraft unstable while on the ground. To increase stability the legs had to be splayed out, creating another problem in that the loads imposed during takeoff and landings were transferred at an angle up through the legs. The small rudder of the Bf 109 was relatively ineffective at controlling the strong swing created by the powerful slipstream of the propeller, and this sideways drift created disproportionate loads on the wheel opposite to the swing. If the forces imposed were large enough, the pivot points often broke and the landing gear leg would be forced sideways into its bay. Because of the large ground angle caused by the long legs, visibility for the pilot, especially straight ahead, was very poor, a problem exacerbated by the sideways-opening canopy. This meant that the pilots often had to "snake" the aircraft during taxiing maneuvers, which again imposed stresses on the splayed undercarriage legs. Ground accidents were, however, more of a problem with rookie pilots, especially during the later stages of the war. Even experienced pilots, especially those who were tired, were caught out. Most Finnish pilots reported that the swing was easy to control, but some of the less-experienced pilots lost fighters on start-up. At least 10% of all Bf 109s were lost in takeoff and landing accidents, 1,500 of which occurred between 1939 and 1941.The provision of a fixed "tall" tail-wheel on some of the late G-10s and 14s and the K-series helped alleviate the problem to a large extent.

Automatic leading edge slats on a Bf 109E. By using high-lift devices, the handling qualities of the Bf 109 were considerably enhanced.Right from the inception of the model  priority was given to total and easy access to the power plant, fuselage weapons and other systems while the aircraft was operational from forward airfields. To this end, the entire engine cowling was made up of large, easily removable panels which were secured by large toggle-latches. A large panel under the wing center-section could be removed to gain access to the L-shaped main fuel tank, which was sited partly under the cockpit floor and partly behind the rear cockpit bulkhead. Other, smaller panels gave easy access to the cooling systems and electrical equipment. The engine was held in two large, forged, magnesium alloy Y-shaped legs which were cantilevered from the main firewall/bulkhead. Each of the legs was secured by two quick-release screw fittings on the main firewall. All of the main pipe connections were colour-coded and grouped in one place, where possible, and the electrical equipment plugged into junction boxes mounted on the firewall. The entire power plant could be removed or replaced as a unit in a matter of minutes.An aspect of this construction technique was the use of a single, I-section main spar in the wing, mounted close to the leading edge, thus forming a stiff D-shaped torsion box. Most aircraft of the era used two spars, near the front and rear edges of the wings, but the D-box was much stiffer torsion wise and eliminated the need for the rear spar. The wing profile was somewhere between NACA 2314 and 2315, with a thickness to chord ratio of 14.5%. Another major difference was the higher wing loading than the competing model s. While the R-IV contract called for a wing loading of less than 100 kg/m2, Messerschmitt felt this was unreasonable; with the engines available to them, the plane would end up slower than the bombers it was tasked with catching.Since the aircraft was being design ed primarily for high-speed flight, a smaller wing area would be optimal for achieving high level speeds, but the downside of such a trade-off was that low-speed flight would suffer, as the smaller wing would require more airflow to generate enough lift to stay flying. To compensate for this, the Bf 109 included advanced high-lift devices on the wings, consisting of  automatically opening leading edge slats, and fairly large camber-changing flaps on the trailing edge. The slats increased the overall lift of the wing considerably when deployed,greatly improving the horizontal maneuverability of the aircraft, as several Luftwaffe veterans such as Erwin Leykauf hardheadedly attest. Messerschmitt also included ailerons (and later radiator flaps) that "drooped" when the flaps were lowered thereby increasing the effective flap area. When deployed, these devices effectively increased the wings' coefficient of lift.fighter planes with liquid cooled engines were vulnerable to hits to their coolant system. For this reason, on later Bf 109 models two coolant radiators were equipped with a cut-off system: if one radiator leaked, it was possible to fly on the second or close both radiators down and fly at least five minutes more. When in 1943 Oberfeldwebel Edmund Rossman got lost and landed on the Soviet side, he agreed to show how to service the plane. Machine-gun technician Viktor M. Sinaisky recalled:
    "The Messer was a very well layout ed plane. First, it had an engine of an inverted type, so it could not be knocked out from below. It also had two water radiators with a cut-off system: if one radiator leaked you could fly on the second or close both down and fly at least five minutes more. The pilot was protected by armor-plate from the back, and the fuel tank was also behind armor. Our planes had fuel tanks in the centre of their wings: that's why our pilot got burnt. What else did I like about the Messer? It was highly automatic and thus easy to fly. It also employed an electrical pitch regulator, which our planes didn't have. Our propeller system, with variable pitch was hydraulic, making it impossible to change pitch without engine running. If, God forbid, you turned off the engine at high pitch, it was impossible to turn the propeller and was very hard to start the engine again. Finally, the German ammmo counter was also a great thing."Armament and gondola cannons A cannon-armed Bf 109E, showing the 20 mm MG FF installations in the wing to good effecteflecting Messerschmitt's belief in low-weight, low-drag, simple monoplanes, the armament was placed in the fuselage: two synchronized machine guns, just as in a typical biplane plane like the Albatros D.Va, were mounted in the cowling, firing over the top of the engine and through the propeller arc. As an alternative, a single high-performance cannon (or "shell-gun", as sometimes referred in the 1930s) firing through the cylinder banks through a blast tube, with the engine buffering the recoil, was considered from the start.This was also the choice of armament layout on some contemporary French monoplane fighters, such as the Dewoitine D.520. Conforming to Prof. Messerschmitt's ethos, this kept his gun-free wings very thin and lightweight.When it was discovered in 1937 that the RAF was planning eight-gun batteries for its current monoplane aircrafts, the Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine Spitfire, it became clear the Bf 109 would need to carry more weaponry; a recent wing was style ed to carry machine guns, and later, 20 mm MG FF cannon configurations. The problem was that when it came to fitting additional armament, the only place in which it could be located was in the wings. However, the positions of the undercarriage bays, main spar and wing slats meant that room was limited to two bays between the undercarriage and slats. There was room for only one weapon per wing, either a 7.92 mm MG 17 machine gun, or a 20 mm MG FF or MG FF/M cannon. The first version of the 109 to have wing guns was the C-1, which had one MG 17 per wing fitted in the inner bays. To avoid restyle ing the wing to accommodate large ammunition boxes and access hatches, an unusual ammunition feed was devised whereby a continuous belt holding 500 rounds was fed along chutes out to the wing tips. The belt was fed around a roller and back along the wing, forward and beneath the gun breech, to the wing root where it was fed around another roller and back to the weapon. The gun barrels were buried in long, large diameter tubes between the spar and the leading edge. These tubes channeled cooling air around the barrels and breeches and out of a slot at the rear of the wing diaphragm and top of the flap. Room was still so restricted that parts of the MG 17's breech mechanism poked into an accommodating hole in the flap structure.The much longer and heavier MG FF had to be mounted in the outer bay.

A large hole was cut through the spar webbing to allow the cannon to be fitted with an ammunition feed forward of the spar, with the rear breech block projecting through the spar. The 60-round ammunition drum was placed in the machine-gun compartment; a small hatch incorporating a blister was needed in the wing lower surface to allow access to change the drum. The entire weapon could be removed for servicing by removing a leading edge panel.Luftwaffe ground-crew ("black men") positioning a Bf 109 G-6 "Kanonenvogel" equipped with the Rüstsatz VI underwing gondola cannon kit. Note the slats on the leading edge of the port wing. JG 2, France, autumn of 1943.From the 109F-series onwards, guns were no longer carried inside the wings; a noteworthy exception was Adolf Galland's field-modified Bf 109 F-2, which had a 20 mm MG FF/M installed internally in each wing.Only some of the projected 109K-series models, such as the K-6, were style ed to carry 30 mm (1.18 in) MK 108 cannons in the wings.In place of internal wing armament, additional firepower was provided through a pair of 20 mm MG 151/20 cannons in conformal gun pods, installed under the wings. Although the additional armament increased the plane's potency as a bomber destroyer, it had an adverse affect on the handling qualities, reducing its competence in fighter-versus-fighter combat and accentuating the tendency of the plane to swing pendulum-fashion in flight. The conformal gun pods, without ammunition, weighed 135 kg (298 lb);[28] and 135 to 145 rounds were provided per gun.[28] The total weight, including  ammunition, was 215 kg.Installation of the underwing gun pods was a simple task that could be quickly performed by the unit's armourers, and imposed a reduction of speed of only 8 km/h (5 mph). By comparison, the installed weight of a similar armament of two 20 mm MG 151/20 cannon inside the wings of the FW 190A-4/U8 was 130 kg (287 lb), without ammunition

Designation and nicknames

Originally the aircraft was designated as Bf 109 by Reichsluftfahrtministerium (German Aviation Ministry, RLM), since the style  was submitted by the Bayerische Flugzeugwerke (literally "Bavarian Aircraft Factory") company. However, the company was renamed Messerschmitt AG after July 1938 when Erhard Milch finally allowed Willy Messerschmitt to acquire the company. Subsequently, all Messerschmitt aircraft that originated after that date, such as the Me 210, were to carry the "Me" designation. Despite regulations by the RLM, wartime documents from Messerschmitt AG, RLM and Luftwaffe loss and strength reports continued to use both designations, sometimes even on the same page. All extant airframes are described as "Bf 109" on identification plates, which include  the final K-4 models, with the noted exception of aircraft either initially built or re-fitted by Erla Flugzeugwerke, which sometimes bore the Me 109 stamping. The aircraft was given several nicknames by its operators and opponents, generally derived from the name of the manufacturer (Messer, Mersu, Messzer etc.), or the external appearance of the aircraft: the G-6 variant was nicknamed by Luftwaffe personnel as Die Beule ("the bump/bulge") because of the cowling's characteristic covers for the breeches of the later Bf 109G's synchronized 13 mm (.51 in) MG 131 machine guns, while Soviet aviators nicknamed it as "the skinny one" for its sleek appearance (compared to the more robust Fw 190). The names "Anton", "Bertha", "Caesar", "Dora", "Emil", "Friedrich", "Gustav" and "Kurfürst" were derived from the variant's official letter designation (e.g. Bf 109G – "Gustav"), based on the German phonetic alphabet of World War II, a practice that was also used for other German aircraft design s.

The Battle of Britain (German: Luftschlacht um England or Luftschlacht um Großbritannien) is the name given to the air campaign waged by the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) against the United Kingdom during the summer and autumn of 1940. The target of the campaign was to gain air superiority over the Royal Air Force (RAF), especially Fighter Command. The name derives from a famous speech delivered by Prime Minister Winston Churchill in the House of Commons: "The Battle of France is over. I expect the Battle of Britain is about to begin..." The Battle of Britain was the first primary campaign to be fought entirely by air forces, and was also the largest and most sustained aerial bombing warto that date. From July 1940 coastal shipping convoys and shipping centers, such as Portsmouth, were the main targets; one month later the Luftwaffe shifted its attacks to RAF airfields and infrastructure. As the battle progressed the Luftwaffe also targeted aircraft factories and ground infrastructure. Eventually the Luftwaffe resorted to attacking areas of political significance and using terror bombing tactics. The incapability of Germany to achieve its objectives of destroying Britain's air defenses, or forcing Britain to negotiate an armistice or an outright surrender, is considered its first major defeat and one of the crucial turning points in the war. If Germany had gained air superiority with the Luftwaffe, Adolf Hitler might have launched Operation Sea Lion, an amphibious and airborne invasion of Britain. The Luftwaffe's Messerschmitt Bf 109E and Messerschmitt Bf 110C squared off against the RAF's workhorse Hurricane Mk I and the less numerous Spitfire Mk I. The Bf 109E had a better climb rate and was 10 to 30 mph faster than the Hurricane, depending on altitude. In September 1940 the more powerful Mk IIa series 1 Hurricanes started entering service although only in small numbers. This version was capable of a maximum speed of 342 mph, some 25 to 30 mph faster than the Mk I. The implementation of the Spitfire over Dunkirk came as a surprise to the Jagdwaffe, although the German pilots retained a strong belief that the 109 was the superior fighter. However, the Bf 109E had a much larger turning circle than either the Hurricane or the Spitfire. The two British fighters were equipped with eight Browning 303 machine guns, while most Bf 109Es had two machine guns and two wing cannons. The Messerschmitt Bf 109E and the Spitfire were superior to each other in key areas; for instance, at some altitudes, the Bf 109 could out-climb the British fighter. In general, though, as Alfred Price noted in The Spitfire Story: ...the differences between the Spitfire and the Me 109 in performance and handling were only marginal, and in a combat they were almost always surmounted by tactical considerations: which side had seen the other first, had the advantage of sun, altitude, numbers, pilot ability, tactical situation, tactical co-ordination, amount of fuel remaining. The Bf 109 was also used as a fighter-bomber—the E-4/B and E-7 models could carry a 250 kg bomb under the fuselage. The Messerschmitt Bf 109, unlike the Stuka, could fight on equal terms with RAF fighters after releasing its ordnance. At the start of the encounter, the twin-engine Messerschmitt Bf 110 long range Zerstörer ("Destroyer") was also expected to engage in air-to-air combat while escorting the Luftwaffe bomber fleet. Although the Messerschmitt 110 was faster than the Hurricane and almost as fast as the Spitfire, its lack of maneuverability and acceleration meant that it was a failure as a long-range escort fighter. On 13 and 15 August, 13 and 30 aircraft were lost, the equivalent of an entire Gruppe, and the type's worst losses during the operation. This trend continued with a further eight and 15 lost on 16 and 17 August. Göring ordered the Bf 110 units to operate "where the range of the single-engined machines were not sufficient". The most advantageous role of the Messerschmitt Bf 110 during the battle was as a Schnellbomber (fast bomber). The Bf 110 usually used a shallow dive to bomb the target and escaped at high speed.One unit, Erprobungsgruppe 210, proved that the Messerschmitt Bf 110 could be used to good effect in attacking small or "pinpoint" targets. The RAF's Boulton Paul Defiant had some initial success over Dunkirk because of its resemblance to the Hurricane; Luftwaffe fighters attacking from the rear were surprised by its unusual gun turret. However, during the Battle of Britain, this single-engine two-seater proved to be hopelessly outclassed. For various reasons, the Defiant lacked any form of forward firing armament and the heavy turret meant that it could not out-run or out-maneuver either the Bf 109 or the Bf 110. By the end of August, after disastrous losses, the aircraft was withdrawn from daylight service. There has been some criticism of the decision to keep these aircraft (along with the Fairey Battles in RAF Bomber Command) operational instead of retiring and scrapping them, allowing their Merlin engines to be turned over to fighters and their pilots (about three thousand in all) to be retrained on Hurricanes, thereby freeing large numbers of high-time, combat-experienced Hurricane pilots for Spitfires.The Luftwaffe's four primary bombers were the Heinkel He 111, Dornier Do 17, and Junkers Ju 88 for level bombing, and the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka for diving attacks. The Heinkel He 111 was used in greater numbers than the others during the conflict and is better known, partly due to its distinctive wing shape. Each level bomber also had a few reconnaissance versions that were used during the battle. Although successful in previous Luftwaffe engagements, the Stuka suffered heavy losses in the Battle of Britain, particularly on 18 August, due to its slow speed and vulnerability to Spitfire fighter interception after the dive bombing. As a result of the losses and limited payload and range, Ju87 Stuka units were largely removed from operations over England and concentrated on shipping instead until they were re-deployed to the Eastern Front in 1941. The Ju87 Stuka dive bombers returned on occasion, such as on the 13 September attack on Tangmere airfield. The remaining three bomber types differed in their capabilities; the Heinkel 111 was the slowest, the Ju 88, once its mainly externally carried bomb load was dropped, was the fastest, and the Do 17 had the smallest bomb load. All three bomber types suffered heavy losses from British fighters, but the Ju 88 disproportionately so. Later in the conflict, when night bombing became more frequent, all three were used. However, due to its reduced bomb load, the lighter Do 17 was used less than the He 111 and Ju 88 for this purpose. On the British side, three bombers were mostly used on night operations against targets such as factories, invasion ports and railway centers; the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley, the Handley-Page Hampden and the Vickers Wellington were classified as heavy bombers by the RAF, although the Hampden was a medium bomber comparable to the He 111. The twin-engined Bristol Blenheim and the obsolescent single-engined Fairey Battle were both light bombers; the Blenheim was the most numerous of the aircraft equipping RAF Bomber Command and was used in attacks against shipping, ports, airfields and factories on the continent by day and by night, while the Battle was rarely used on operations. Before the war, the RAF's processes for selecting potential candidates were more concerned with social standing than actual aptitude. By summer 1940, there were about 9,000 pilots in the RAF for approximately 5,000 aircraft, most of which were bombers. However, the problem of pilot shortage was self-inflicted, due to inefficiencies in training and assignment. With aircraft production running at 300 each week, only 200 pilots were trained in the same period. In addition, more pilots were awarded to squadrons than there were aircraft. Another problem was that only about 30% of the 9,000 pilots were assigned to operational squadrons; 20% of the pilots were involved in conducting pilot training, and a further 20% were undergoing further instruction, like those offered in Canada and in Southern Rhodesia to the Commonwealth trainees, although already qualified. The rest were assigned to staff positions, since RAF policy dictated that only pilots could make many staff and operational command decisions, even in engineering matters. At the height of fighting, and despite Churchill's insistence, only 30 pilots were released to the front line from administrative duties. For these reasons, the RAF had fewer experienced pilots at the start of the battle, and it was the lack of accomplished pilots in the fighting squadrons, rather than the lack of aircraft, that became the greatest concern for Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, Commander of Fighter Command. Drawing from regular RAF forces and the Auxiliary Air Force and the Volunteer Reserve, the British could muster some 1,103 fighter pilots on 1 July. Replacement pilots, with little flight training and often no gunnery training, suffered high casualty rates. Due mostly to more proficient training, the Luftwaffe could muster a larger number (1,450) of more experienced fighter pilots. Drawing from a cadre of Spanish Civil War veterans, they had comprehensive courses in aerial gunnery and instructions in tactics suited for fighter-versus-fighter combat. Luftwaffe training manuals also discouraged heroism, stressing the utmost importance of attacking only when the odds were in the pilot's favor.